New Common Law Dramshop Rule by Cahn, Stephen J.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1960
New Common Law Dramshop Rule
Stephen J. Cahn
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Cahn, New Common Law Dramshop Rule, 9 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 302 (1960)
New Common Law Dramshop Rule
Stephen J. Cahn*
T HE SUPREME COURT of New Jersey in the recent case of
Rappaport v. Nichols' has announced a doctrine of common
law liability of tavern keepers very much contra to the existing
law as presently understood and applied by the vast majority
of the courts of this country. This decision, if indicative of a
trend, will serve to impose liability upon tavern keepers where
previously it appears that none has existed in the absence of
statute.
In the case cited, the plaintiff brought an action in the New
Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, for the death of her de-
cedent and for damages to her automobile received in an auto-
mobile accident. It was alleged that Robert Nichols, a minor,
one of the defendants, while intoxicated collided with the auto-
mobile of the plaintiff being driven by the plaintiff's decedent,
and further that Nichols was intoxicated by reason of the negli-
gent and unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor to him by the co-
defendant tavern keepers. It should be noted that a Dram Shop
Act was in force in New Jersey at one time but it was repealed
in 1934.
The tavern keepers moved in the Law Division Court for
a summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action and that as a matter of
law they were entitled to judgment. This motion for summary
judgment was granted by the judge, who stated that while in
some other jurisdictions outside of New Jersey one may be held
responsible for the actions of another to whom he has sold in-
toxicating liquor, such was not the law in New Jersey, and that
to apply the doctrine of foreseeability to the facts in this case
would stretch the intent of the doctrine too far.
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey certified
the matter on its own motion. The result in the Supreme Court
was to reverse and remand the case for trial on the factual
issue of proximate causation between the defendant's unlawful
negligent conduct and the plaintiff's injuries. The Supreme
Court found that a proximate cause relation may be found be-
tween the unlawful sale of alcoholic beverages by tavern keep-
ers and the subsequent injury to a third person caused by the
intoxicated person.
As the court stated in its opinion:
If the patron is a minor or is intoxicated when served, the
tavern keeper's sale to him is unlawful; and if the circum-
*B.S., Univ. of Florida; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
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stances are such that the tavern keeper knows or should
know that the plaintiff is a minor or is intoxicated, his
service to him may also constitute common law negligence.2
(Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court has stated a rule attributable to the
common law, but which the common law never knew according
to the decisions of the vast majority of our courts.
The Common Law Doctrine
It had been uniformly held that there was no remedy at
common law, against persons selling or giving intoxicating
liquor, for the resulting injuries or damages due to the acts of
the intoxicated person, whether on the theory that the dis-
pensing was a direct wrong or on the ground that it was negli-
gence which raises a liability for resulting damages.3 The Wis-
consin court stated the rule succinctly in Damage v. Feierstein: 4
The cases are overwhelmingly to the effect that there is no
cause of action at common law against a vendor of liquor
in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the vendee.
The reason generally given for this rule is that the proximate
cause of the injury is not the furnishing of the liquor, but the
drinking of it. 5 A good example of this reasoning is to be found
in the Tennessee case of Tarwater v. Atlantic Co." There, a
painter, the plaintiff, was employed by a contractor to do painting
at the defendant's place of business. The defendant distributed a
large quantity of free beer to plaintiff's fellow employees and they
became highly intoxicated. One of them dropped a large plank
on the plaintiff. It was held by the court that the voluntary act
of drinking the beer, by the fellow employee, and not the fur-
nishing of the beer by the defendant, was the proximate cause
of the injury; therefore, the defendant was not liable for the
plaintiff's injuries.
The common law doctrine has also been upheld by the courts
in the case of service to minors by the tavern keeper. Service
to a minor is generally an unlawful act in all jurisdictions. The
California Appeals case of Fleckner v. Dionne7 is a case very
similar to the one here discussed. In this case, Fleckner sued
Dionne, a minor, and co-defendant tavern keeper for damages
2 Id. at p. 9.
3 Christoff v. Gradsky, 140 N.E. 2d 586 (Ohio C. P. 1956); Cruse v. Aden,
127 Ill. 231, 20 N. E. 73 (1889); Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474, 283 N. W.
778 (1939); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P. 2d 952 (1943); Hill
v. Alexander, 321 Il1. App. 406, 53 N.E. 2d 307 (1944); Howlett v. Doglio,
402 M11. 311, 83 N. E. 2d 708 (1949).
4 222 Wis. 199, 268 N. W. 210, 212 (1936).
5 Hitson v. Dwyer, supra note 3; Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N. W. 2d
886 (1955); Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (Alaska 1950).
6 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W. 2d 746 (1940).
7 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P. 2d 530 (1949).
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allegedly suffered in an automobile collision. The complaint
alleged that the defendant tavern keeper knew that defendant
Dionne was a minor and that he knew that Dionne was already
under the influence of intoxicating liquor and also that Dionne
had an automobile on or near the premises, which he would
drive. The California District Court of Appeals held that the
sale of the liquor to the minor defendant was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that the complaint did not state
a cause of action against the tavern keeper. California does not
have a Dram Shop Act and therefore the plaintiff had no cause
of action, either by statute or under the common law, against
the tavern keeper.
Another case coming to the same conclusion is a Maryland
case s where the defendant tavern keeper allegedly sold intoxi-
cating liquor to a minor motorist, and the minor as a result of
his intoxicated condition drove his automobile at an excessive
rate of speed and collided with the automobile driven by the
plaintiff's intestate. The court held that the plaintiff had no
cause of action for the wrongful death of her husband against
the defendant tavern keeper for the selling of intoxicating liquor
to the minor or for causing the intoxication of the minor motorist
whose negligent or wilful act caused the death of the plaintiff's
intestate.
In Barboza v. Decas,9 it was held that the mere violation
of a statute forbidding sale of liquor to a minor and imposing
as a penalty a fine or imprisonment, in itself and independent of
any other ground does not give the plaintiff a cause of action.
In those states where liability is placed on the tavern keeper
by statute in the case of an illegal sale (i.e., a sale to a minor),
the courts have naturally found liability, but not without some
difficulty. The Pennsylvania case of Manning v. Yokas' ° illus-
strates this. Pennsylvania had a statute, repealed later between
the time of the injury sustained by the plaintiff and the time
of trial. The statute made it a misdemeanor to willfully furnish
intoxicating drinks to a minor, and further provided that any
person violating the statute shall be held civilly responsible for
any injury in consequence of such furnishing. The Common
Pleas Court held that where the injury is in consequence of his
act in conjunction with the act of another there would appear
to be no remedy under the statute. Upon appeal the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed," holding the tavern keeper
liable and stating that the lower court went astray from the
plain wording of the statute.
In summary, at common law and apart from statute no re-
dress exists against persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors
8 State for use of Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 257, 78 A. 2d 754 (1951).
9 Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10, 40 N. E. 2d 10 (1942).
10 43 Del. Co. (Pa.) 171, 70 York 73 (1956).
11 Manning v. Yokas, 389 Pa. 136, 132 A. 2d 198 (1957).
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for the injuries sustained by third persons as a result of the in-
toxication of the vendee or recipient of the liquor. The reason
generally stated is that the drinking of the intoxicants is the
proximate cause of the injury, and the sale resulting in the in-
toxication is considered as too remote from the injury.
Civil Damage Acts
In view of the common law rule, it has been considered
necessary, where opinion favored the creation of such a cause
of action, to enact Civil Damage Acts, or, as they are popularly
known, Dram Shop Acts. The term "dramshop" is generally
used to designate a place where intoxicating liquors are sold at
a public bar frequented by the public without restriction. 12 The
civil damage acts are statutes providing that certain classes of
persons, upon sustaining injuries from the acts of an intoxicated
person, or in consequence of his intoxication, habitual or other-
wise, shall have a right of action against the persons, who by
selling or giving him liquor, produced the intoxication. 13
The effect of the statutes is to create a new cause of action,
in tort, which was unknown at common law.14 Their object, as
viewed by the courts, is to suppress the sale and use of intoxi-
cating liquor to drunkards or minors, and to punish those who
furnish means of intoxication to them, by making the vendor
liable for damages caused by the persons who furnished these
means.
15
The statutes in the various states are not uniform, either in
their wording, extent of liability imposed, or in their judicial
interpretation. A study of the statutes in the twenty-one states
where they are now in force," and a study of their annotations,
will serve to confirm this point. In the states in which no statute
is in effect, and where the courts dogmatically follow the old
common law rule, a person injured by an intoxicated person has
12 South Shore Country Club v. People, 228 Ill. 75, 78, 81 N. E. 805, 806
(1907).
13 Moran v. Goodwin, 130 Mass. 158, 39 Am. Rep. 443 (1881).
14 Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N. E. 2d 564 (1939);
Boniewsky v. Polish Home of Lodi, 103 N. J. L. 323, 333, 136 A. 741, 746
(1927).
15 Mead v. Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493, 496, 41 Am. Rep. 386, 388 (1882).
16 Ala. Code tit. 7, ss. 121, 122 (1940); Conn. Gen. Stat. c. 204, s. 4307 (1949),
as amended s. 2172d (supp. 1955); Del. Rev. Code, tit. 4, c. 7 ss. 715, 716
(1953); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 43, ss. 135, 136 (1957); Iowa Code, s. 129.2 (1954);
Me. Rev. Stat., c. 61, s. 95 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws, s. 436.22 (1948); Minn.
Stat., s. 340.95 (1953); Nev. Rev. Stat., s. 202.070 (1957); N. Y. Civil Rights
Law, s. 16; N. C. Gen. Stat., s. 14-332 (1953); N. D. Rev. Code, s. 5-0121(1943); Ohio Rev. Code, ss. 4399.01-.05 (1953); Okla. Stat., tit. 37, s. 121
(1951); Ore. Rev. Stat., s. 30.730 (Repl. 1955); R. I. Gen. Laws, s. 3-11-1 to
-5 (1956); S. D. Code, s. 5.0208 (1939); Vt. Stat., s. 6214 (1947); Wash. Rev.
Code, s. 71.08.080 (1951); Wis. Stat., s. 176.35 (1955); Wyo. Comp. Stat., s.
53-226 (1945).
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a right of action only against that person actually negligent
rather than against the person furnishing the intoxicants.
A brief study of the history of these statutes reveals that
the first such act was passed in Maine in 1851,17 and provided
for outright prohibition. Thereafter, other states passed these
statutes imposing liability upon tavern keepers in various de-
grees. The Illinois Act"' is probably the most stringent since it
imposes liability not only upon tavern keepers, but also upon
lessors of the premises where the liquor is sold. This act has
remained substantially unchanged from the date of its enactment
in 1874.
It is not the purpose of this note to make a comparison of
the relative merits or demerits of the various civil damage acts
now in force. A study of them by the interested reader will
reveal their basic differences. It is the purpose of this note to
determine whether the New Jersey Supreme Court has adequate
grounds upon which to overrule the common law rule.
It has been seen that a number of states have considered the
common law doctrine of no liability of tavern keepers, and feel-
ing that a remedy for a wrong is desirable for the protection of
innocent third persons injured as a result of the intoxication of
persons served by the tavern keeper, have legislated upon the
subject in varying degrees. In those states the only function
of the court is to interpret the act according to the intent of the
legislature which passed the act. There is no authority under
any rule of statutory construction to add to, enlarge, supply,
expand, extend or improve the provisions of the statute to meet
a situation not provided for.19 If the act is not very broad in
its application because of the express provisions of the statute,
nevertheless the court still is bound to apply it as it is passed,
and not broaden it by judicial fiat.
The question then to be determined is the state of the law
in those states wherein the legislature has not acted to pass a
civil damage act, and further, the state of the law in those states
where the legislature had at one time enacted such a statute that
it later has expressly repealed. New Jersey is a state in this
latter classification. Is there good reason and compelling neces-
sity to hold tavern keepers liable for the drunken acts of their
patrons? This question has been answered in the affirmative by
the passage of civil damage acts by a number of states and the
upholding of these statutes by the courts against attack. Do the
courts have the power and authority to impose this liability in
the absence of statute? This question is much more difficult
to answer positively.
17 3 Dictionary of Am. History 327 (1940).
18 Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 43, ss. 135, 136 (1957).
19 State ex. rel. Foster v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 65, 105, 56 N. E. 2d 265, 282(1944).
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The Situation in New Jersey
The New Jersey Legislature enacted a Civil Damage Act in
192120 and 1922.21 This act imposed strict liability for compen-
satory and punitive damages, upon unlawful sellers of alcoholic
beverages. This statute was repealed by the Legislature in 1934,
at the termination of national prohibition.2 2 Therefore New
Jersey at the time Rappaport v. Nichols 23 was decided is not a
state with a civil damage act in full force and effect. It has al-
ready been noted that the overwhelming authority is that in the
absence of statute the common law knows no such remedy in
an action of the type brought. The State of New Jersey at the
present time has the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act in effect; 24
however there is no right of action provided for which would
be similar to the Dram Shop Act previously in force.
The New Jersey Constitution adopted the English Common
Law bodily as part of the jurisprudence of that state, and under
that constitution the common law remains in force until it ex-
pires by its own limitation or is altered or repealed by the legis-
lature.2
5
Georgia also follows the common law in the absence of
statute.26 There is no dramshop act in effect in Georgia. In the
case of Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgi, 27 the court stated
that, whatever were the reasons for the common law rule of
lack of right of recovery for selling or furnishing intoxicating
liquor to an intoxicated person, and whether the courts agree or
disagree with such reasons, the courts have no authority to grant
recoveries. They may not authorize actions unknown to the
common law; that is for the legislature to do. In addition the
same court stated that the courts may, in proper instances, apply
old rules to newly created situations; but they cannot create
new rules for situations already regulated. The court held that
the drinking of the intoxicating liquor was the proximate cause
of such injuries, and the alleged negligent acts of the Hotel
Company were too remote to authorize a recovery in the ab-
sence of a Dram Shop Act to the contrary. Here the court
followed the common law rule in the absence of a statute, al-
though it would appear from the opinion that perhaps the court
did not fully agree with the common law rule.
20 N. J. Session Laws, 1921, c. 103, p. 184.
21 Id, 1922, c. 257, p. 628.
22 Id, 1934, c. 32, p. 104.
23 Supra note 1.
24 N. J. S. A., R. S., 33:1-1 et. seq. '(1937).
25 N. J. S. A., Const., Art. 11, Sec. 1, par. 3. See also N. J. Const. of 1844,
Art. 10, Par. 1, N. J. S. A., Const., p. 712. Scudder v. Trenton Delaware
Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694, 23 Am. Dec. 756 (1832).
26 Parrish v. Taggart-Delph Lumber Co., 11 Ga. App. 772, 76 S. E. 153 (1912).
27 70 Ga. App. 379, 28 S. E. 2d 329 (1943).
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Must a court in a common law jurisdiction follow the com-
mon law rule in the absence of legislation on the subject be-
fore the court? While some courts would state that they must,
as witness the court in the Henry Grady Hotel Co. case28 it ap-
pears that the better rule is to the contrary.
It has been said by the courts that the common law does not
consist of absolute, fixed and inflexible rules, but rather of broad
and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason and com-
mon sense, and that it is of judicial origin and promulgation and
its principles are susceptible of adaptation to new conditions, in-
terests, relations and usages as the progress of society may re-
quire.29 The common law is not a static but a growing thing, and
its rules arise from application of reason to the changing con-
ditions of society.30 The Ohio court in Bloom v. Richards2 '
stated:
The English Common Law, as far as it is reasonable in it-
self, suitable to the conditions and business of our people,
and consistent with the letter and spirit of our Federal and
State Constitution and statutes, has been and is followed
by our courts and may be said to constitute a part of the
Common Law of Ohio. But wherever it has been found
wanting in either of their requisites, our courts have not
hesitated to modify it to suit our circumstances or if neces-
sary wholly to depart from it.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Breen v. Peck32, has stated
that there can hardly be any question of the court's power to
remold the English Common Law.
In 1958, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the case of
Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary33 overruled the im-
munity of all non-profit eleemosynary corporations, holding that
it could constitutionally overturn the tort immunity doctrine
with respect to non-profit eleemosynary corporations based on
the common law, in view of the fact that the common law is
not so inflexible as a statute, but may be modified as circum-
stances require. The New Jersey court in that case was only
following the trend exemplified by the 1956 Ohio decision of
Avellone v. St. Johns Hospital34, where the court at page 476
stated:
28 Supra note 27.
29 Miller v. Monson, 228 Minn. 400, 406, 37 N. W. 2d 543, 547 (1949).
30 Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n., 128 F. 2d 645, 648
(4th Cir. 1942).
31 2 Ohio St. 387, 390 (1853).
32 28 N. J. 351, 146 A. 2d 665 (1958).
33 27 N. J. 29, 141 A. 2d 276 (1958).
34 165 Ohio St. 467, 476, 135 N. E. 2d 410, 416 (1956). See Lipson, Charitable
Immunity-the Plague of Modem Tort Concepts, 7 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 483
(1958).
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Whatever the reasons for the public policy that gave rise
to the rule of immunity, public policy today, examined in
the light of present day conditions, will not support such a
rule.
Another case decided earlier in 1959 than Rappaport v.
Nichol&35 is Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store,30 decided in
the United States Court of Appeals. This was a diversity action
for damages sustained by the plaintiffs when the automobile in
which they were riding collided in the State of Michigan with
the automobile driven by defendant. The sale of the intoxicating
liquor to defendant was in Illinois. The court held that neither
the Illinois nor the Michigan Civil Damage Act applied in this
case, due to the way the statutes were written. However, the
court held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action in tort against
the defendant tavern keepers for the damages and injuries sus-
stained by them as a proximate result of the unlawful acts of the
tavern keepers in making the sale of intoxicating liquor to an in-
toxicated person. The court stated that the common law of
Michigan as to tort liability controlled. The common law, by
virtue of the penal section which makes the sale of liquor to
an intoxicated person unlawful, gives a civil right of action in
tort against the sellers. There was a strong dissent in the case:
that while it may be socially desirable to hold tavern keepers
responsible under the circumstances presented by this case, that
result however should be achieved through a congressional act
rather than by judicial interpretation. It can be seen that the
minority opinion in this case clings to the view expressed in
Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis.37
Another case recently decided by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court is that of Schelin v. Goldberg,38 also in the absence of a
dram shop act and on general common law negligence rules.
This was an action against a bar owner for injuries sustained
in a bar after the patron, plaintiff, was allegedly intoxicated. A
Civil Damage Act had been in force in Pennsylvania for some
time but had been repealed before the right of action in this
case arose. The court stated that the section of the Liquor Code
making it unlawful to sell, furnish or give any liquor to any
person visibly intoxicated was enacted to protect society generally
and to protect specifically intoxicated persons from their inability
to exercise self-protective care. As a matter of law the plaintiff
could not be guilty of contributory negligence in getting intoxi-
cated voluntarily. It was negligence for the bar owner to serve
intoxicating beverages to an intoxicated patron, and this negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries for which
he could sue.
35 Supra note 1.
36 269 F. 2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
37 Supra note 27.
38 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A. 2d 648 (1958).
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Conclusion
If the tort immunity of non-profit eleemosynary corporations
may be overturned by the decisions of a court in the absence
of statute, it is not very difficult to see that in our changing times
the immunity of a tavern keeper may also be overturned, in the
absence of statute, no matter how well established the common
law rule seems to be. No one can seriously dispute the fact that
the drinking of intoxicants is too prevalent in our society, and
further that we live in an era of widespread car ownership,
not only among adults, but also among minors. The court in Mc-
Kinney v. Foster states: 39
It is common knowledge that great numbers of persons,
minors as well as adults, drive automobiles while intoxi-
cated, and it is well within the realm of possibility that one
illegally served with intoxicants might negligently drive an
automobile and cause injury to persons or property.
Negligence is the doing of that thing which a reasonably prudent
person would not have done, or the failure to do that thing
which a reasonably prudent person would have done, in like or
similar circumstances. 40 It is not beyond the realm of possibility,
and even very probable, that a person who is served intoxicants
will soon be driving. A tavern keeper owes a duty to the public
not to serve intoxicated persons or minors; and if he does so
serve them, why should he not be held liable along with the
vendee for his negligence in so doing?
The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that service to
a minor or to an intoxicated person may constitute common law
negligence.41 When a tavern keeper sells alcoholic beverages to
a person who is visibly intoxicated or to a person whom he knows
or should know is a minor, he ought to be able to recognize and
foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others through the
action of the intoxicated person or the minor.
It appears that the New Jersey case of Rappaport v.
Nichols42 is the first where a Supreme Court of a state has per-
mitted civil liability to be imposed upon tavern keepers, in the
absence of statute, for their negligence in service to a minor or
to an intoxicated person. However it is safe to say that it will not
be the last.
39 391 Pa. 221, 225, 137 A. 2d 502, 504 (1958).
40 Biddle v. Mazzocco, 204 Or. 547, 284 P. 2d 364 (1955).
41 Rappaport v. Nichols, supra note 1 at 9.
42 Supra note 1.
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